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Transforming the Constitution: A Multidisciplinary Study
Victory of Law is a dense, important, and thought-provoking book. Deak
Nabers, a professor of literature at Brown University, examines the dilemmas of
slavery, race, liberty, civil war, and law in the years 1852 to 1867. Nabers
explores political and constitutional arguments on these topics, but he also
examines, for example, Melville's Battle Pieces, essays by Thoreau, poems by
Whitman, and Uncle Tom's Cabin. He discusses the legal and constitutional
thought of abolitionists William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips (who
generally read the pre-Civil War Constitution and the law as a pact with the devil
that protected slavery), that of Alvin Stewart (who read it as a charter of liberty),
as well as the constitutional thought of Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A.
Douglas. In a concluding chapter, Nabers discusses the contribution of
Congressman John A. Bingham, the primary author of section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment. That section made all persons born in the nation citizens
of the United States and of their states, provided that no state should abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, and guaranteed due
process and equal protection to all persons.
It is a lot to cover in 198 pages of text, even though the print is small.
Generally, Nabers covers these topics well. What unifies many of these
somewhat disparate sources is the tension between a positive law that protected
slavery and ethical aspirations for a law that protected liberty. Melville describes
the Civil War as a victory of law, but it is victory won by brute force. Melville's
invocation of the victory of law is more ambivalent than it seems at first.
There is also the tension between the Constitution's ethical aspirations and
some of its words (e.g., no person shall be deprived of ...liberty...without due
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process of law) and its historic purposes and interpretation and its other clauses
(such as the clause counting slaves as three-fifths of a person and that requiring
their return to slavery if they escape to a free state). This tension is reflected in
the view of Garrison and others who see no redeeming features in the law or the
Constitution. Indeed they rejected the law and the Constitution as instruments of
slavery and despotism. Other abolitionist constitutional theorists affirm the
Constitutionùeven before the post-Civil War amendmentsùas a charter of liberty.
The great pre-Civil War tension is between morality and ethical aspirations
and positive law that supports slavery. According to Nabers, much modern
scholarship often sees 19th century law and moral claims for civil rights as
opposed to each other. For him, this view is too simple, and an increasing
number of legal scholars agree. Garrison attacked the law and slavery with equal
relish; Bingham celebrated civil rights and the Constitution with equal relish
(18).
As Nabers sees it, section one of the Fourteen Amendment, mostly written
in 1866 by Bingham, both restored and transformed the nation and the
Constitution. Instead of seeing the Constitution as the handmaiden of slavery,
Bingham saw how it could be transformed into a guarantee of freedom and
equality. Bingham could see his mission as restoring the Constitution because he
cherished the ideals of liberty and equality he found in the Constitution even
before the Reconstruction Amendments. He believed that rightly interpreted, the
pre-Civil War Constitution espoused and protected themùthough the protection
was incomplete. Still, he recognized that past interpretations and slavery in the
original slave states had limited those ideals. Bingham's amendment transformed
the Constitution by nationalizing the ideals of liberty and equality that he found
in the original Constitution and applying them to all the states. Henceforth, for
Bingham, states would be required to respect all privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States (including those in the Bill of Rights). The rights to
equal protection and due process secured to all would prevent crimes against
humanity, such as slavery.Nabers stops his story in 1867. Of course, many of the
goals of Bingham and other Republicans were not realized for quite some time.
Political terrorism effectively nullified liberties for whites as well as blacks and,
in the end, the nation acquiesced in the counter revolution until the 1960s.
Nabers concludes that Bingham's Fourteenth Amendment was a poem as
well as a statement of law. As such, it is subject to various interpretations.
Whatever one makes of this conclusion and some of the details of Nabers
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reading of the history, he has done an insightful job of putting Bingham's
restoration and transformation in its larger context of law and literature.
Scholarship that spans disciplines can makes substantial contributions. But it
also carries its own problems. Each discipline has its own language or, at worst,
its own jargon. With the best will in the world, it is often hard for lawyers to
recall how much of their language and background assumptions are not shared
by the larger scholarly (not to mention the lay) community. A few legal scholars
write in extremely obscure terms. The best do not. The same problems often
plague literary criticism and other disciplines. Some of Nabers's terms and
concepts were opaque for me. These include references (without clarifying
explanations) to the constative and performative aspects of Garrison's arguments
(49) and to the distinction between agency (practical legal effect?) and language
of the Fifth Amendment in John Marshall's opinion in Barron v. Baltimore (144).
When my son was about thirteen he insisted that I should not use any words
he did not know. My wife asked him how big his vocabulary would be if we had
followed that rule since he was two. My criticism may seem equally shallow.
Justice Hugo Black said he wrote for the people at the gas station and the
barbershop. I am with Justice Black on this oneùon the level of aspiration, if not
successful execution. Still, though some of Nabers's prose could be more
transparent, the flaw does not negate the book's virtues. This scholarly and
thoughtful book is of substantial value in understanding the larger literary,
political, constitutional, and intellectual context in which the post-Civil War
amendments were framed.
Michl Kent Curtis teaches at Wake Forest University School of Law. He is
the author of No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill
of Rights, Free Speech: The People's Darling Privilege, and the law review
article John Bingham and the Story of American Liberty: the Lost Cause Meets
the Lost Clause.'
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